Initially, political parties were viewed as the principal instrument of majority control of public policy. “Responsible parties ,” as perceived by the “purists,” are supposed to (1) develop and clarify alternative policy positions for the voters; (2) educate the people about the issues and simplify choices for them; (3) recruit candidates for public office who agree with the parties’ policy positions; (4) organize and direct their candidates’ campaigns to win office; (5) hold their elected officials responsible for enacting the parties’ policy positions after they are elected; and (6) organize legislatures to ensure party control of policymaking. In carrying out these functions, responsible parties are supposed to modify the demands of special interests, build a consensus that could win majority support, and provide simple and identifiable, yet meaningful, choices for the voters on Election Day. In this way, disciplined, issue-oriented, competitive parties are seen as the principal means by which the people would direct public policy and hold elected officials accountable. Critics say such a party system would make bipartisanship more difficult.

Over the years, the “realists” have outlined many shortcomings of the “responsible party” model. Among the most commonly cited are:

• The parties do not offer the voters clear policy alternatives. Instead, each tries to capture the broad center of most policy dimensions, where it believes most Americans can be found. There is no incentive for parties to stand on the far right or far left when most Americans are found in the center. So the parties echo each other, and critics refer to them as “Tweedledee and Tweedledum.”

• Voter decisions are not motivated primarily by policy considerations. Most voters cast their votes on the basis of candidate “image,” the “goodness” or “badness” of the times, and traditional voting habits. This means there is little incentive for either parties or candidates to concentrate on issues. Party platforms are seldom read by anyone. Modern campaign techniques focus on the image of the candidate—compassion, warmth, good humor, experience, physical appearance, ease in front of a camera, and so forth—rather than positions on the issues.

• American political parties have no way to bind their elected officials to party positions or even their campaign pledges. Parties cannot really discipline members of Congress or state legislatures for voting against the party position; only voters can do this at the ballot box. Party cohesion, where it exists, is more a product of like-mindedness among Democratic or Republican legislators than it is of party control.

In addition to these underlying problems, over time candidate-centered politics has been on the upswing due to:

• The rise of primary elections. Party organizations cannot control who the party’s nominee shall be. Nominations are won in primary elections. Progressive reformers introduced primary elections at the beginning of the twentieth century to undercut the power of party machines in determining who runs for office. Nominees now establish personal organizations in primary elections and campaign for popular votes; they do not have to negotiate with party leaders, especially if they are self-financed candidates. Of course, the party organization may endorse a candidate in a primary election, but this is no guarantee of success with the party’s voters.

• The decline of party identification. Democratic and Republican party loyalties have been declining over the years. Most people remain registered as Democrats or Republicans in order to vote in party primary elections, but increasing numbers of people identify themselves as “independent” and cast their vote in general elections without reference to party. Split-ticket voting (where a single voter casts his or her vote for a Democrat in one race and a Republican in another) has also increased in some states.

• More focus on the candidate, less on his or her party affiliation. Primary elections, the decline in party identification, and the importance of direct media communication with the voters have all combined to create candidate-centered politics. Candidates raise their own campaign funds, create their own personal organizations, and hire professional consultants to produce their own ads (many no longer even include their party affiliation in the advertising³ or, if they do, the party label is minimized so as not to call attention to it).

• The influence of the mass media, particularly television and the Web. Candidates can come directly into the voter’s living room via television (broadcast, cable) and into a citizen’s computer and wireless devices via the Internet. Cyberspace-related campaigning has become more essential, particularly in large, fast-growing states where it is more difficult to reach a large proportion of the voters by going door-to-door (shoe leather campaigning). Utilizing social networking sites is a must for today’s campaigns.

• The decline of patronage. Civil service reforms, at the national, state, and even city levels, have reduced the tangible rewards of electoral victory. Party “professionals”—who work in political campaigns to secure jobs and favors for themselves and their friends—are now being replaced by political “amateurs”—who work in political campaigns for the emotional satisfaction of supporting a “cause.” Amateurs work intensely during campaigns, while professionals work year-round, in off-years and election years, building party support with small personal favors for the voters. These party “regulars” are disappearing.

• The rise of single-issue interest groups, PACs, and “527s.” Parties have always coexisted with broad-based interest groups, many of whom contribute money to both Democratic and Republican candidates in order to ensure access regardless of who wins. But many of the more militant single-issue groups require a “litmus test” of individual candidates on single issues—abortion, gun control, immigration. Their support and money hinge on the candidate’s position on a single issue. Most PAC (political action committee) money goes directly to candidates, although some does go to state party organizations. The fastest growing type of group, a “527” organization (named after the portion of the IRS tax code that covers it), can spend unlimited amounts of money on campaign ads or activities but is expressly prohibited from coordinating its efforts with either a party or a candidate.

  

Despite the debate over whether we should have a pure responsible party system, the bottom line is that we do not have one for all the reasons laid out above. Nonetheless, American political parties “have demonstrated amazing adaptability and durability.”⁴ The political reality is that both the major parties (Democratic and Republican) and various minor or third parties continue to perform important political functions:

• Parties organize elections and narrow the choices of political office seekers confronting the voters. In most state elections, the field of candidates in the November general election is narrowed to the Democratic and Republican Party nominees. Few independents are ever elected to high political office in the states. Only five governors in recent decades—Angus King and James Longley of Maine, Walter Hickel of Alaska, Lowell Weicker of Connecticut, and Lincoln Chafee of Rhode Island—have been elected as independents. Jesse Ventura, the Reform Party candidate, won election as Governor of Minnesota over his Democratic and Republican opponents. There are fewer than a dozen independent state legislators in the nation. Nebraska has the nation’s only nonpartisan state legislature. Party nominees—for governor, attorney general, and other statewide executive offices, as well as state legislative seats—are selected in party primary elections in most states or by party conventions or caucuses in others.

• Parties continue to play an important role in voter choice. It is true that political parties have lost much of their attractiveness to voters—a development described as dealignment. That is, fewer people identify themselves as “strong” Democrats or as “strong” Republicans; more people call themselves “independents,” and more people split their votes between candidates of different parties, although this is less the case in highly competitive, evenly divided states. Party labels remain an important influence on voter choice. People who identify themselves as Democrats tend to vote for Democratic candidates, just as people who identify themselves as Republicans vote for Republican candidates. Nationwide the Democratic and Republican parties have inspired popular images of themselves (see Table 5-1). Both parties maintain fairly stable coalitions of supporters—called core voters or the party’s “base.” These national images and coalitions extend into the politics of most, but certainly not all, states. Party identifiers in some states are more conservative or more liberal than their counterparts in others. A Mississippi Democrat is typically more conservative than a Massachusetts Democrat!

  Supportersa
  	Republican (%)	Democratic (%)
  Note: Data are for 2012. a Row percentages do not add up to 100% because independents are excluded from the table. Source: Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, “Detailed Party Identification Tables,” Table 1, 2012. Available at http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-detailed_tables/Detailed%20tables%20for%20Party%20ID.pdf.
  Gender
  Male	29	29
  Female	27	40
  Race/Ethnicity
  White	34	28
  Black	5	76
  Hispanic	16	42
  Ideology
  Conservative	51	18
  Moderate	18	36
  Liberal	5	64
  Age Group
  18–29	23	36
  30–49	27	32
  50–64	29	36
  65+	34	36
  Education
  Less than high school	28	36
  Some college	30	33
  College graduate	29	32
  Post graduate	25	39
  Income
  Under $20,000	20	42
  $20,000–$29,999	23	40
  $30,000–$49,999	29	35
  $50,000–$74,999	31	33
  $75,000–$99,999	30	32
  $100,000–$149,999	30	32
  $150,000 and above	36	30

• Party organizations and activists in the states play an important role in guiding their party and in shaping its image with the voters. Party activists are the people who serve on city, county, or state party committees, or who serve on the staffs of these committees. They regularly work in campaigns and serve on their state’s delegation to the national party conventions. Many elected officials owe their start in politics to being involved in local party activities. Democratic and Republican state party organizations are found in every state. (Each national party’s Web site typically has links to the individual state party organizations, and the state party Web site to local party organizations.) In some states these organizations are more powerful than in other states, but in all 50 states, party organizations are becoming increasingly efficient and more professional in their operations.

• The Democratic and Republican parties perform the central task of organizing state legislatures. Only Nebraska has an official nonpartisan legislature. But in every other state, legislative leadership—for example, the house speaker and senate president—as well as committee chairs, are selected on a party basis. The majority party regularly votes for its own candidates for these posts. (See Chapter 6.)

Primary elections are governed by state law; anyone can file a petition with a minimum number of voter signatures, or pay a small fee, to have his or her name placed on the primary ballot of either party for practically any public office. A candidate does not have to have experience in the party, or even the support of party officials, in order to file for elective office.

Primaries, then, reduce the influence of party organizations in the political process. It is possible, of course, for party organizations at the city, county, or state levels to endorse, officially or unofficially, candidates in primary elections. But party endorsements at the primary election stage may create intraparty friction so it is more common for party organizations to endorse at the general election stage. The importance of endorsements varies with the strength and unity of party organizations. Where party organizations are strong at the city or county level, the word can be passed down to precinct committee members to turn out the party’s faithful for the endorsed candidate. Party endorsement in a statewide race appears to have less value.

Primary elections in most states are closed primaries—that is, only voters who have previously registered as members of a party may vote in that party’s primary. (See Table 5-2.) Only registered Democrats vote in the Democratic primary, and only registered Republicans vote in the Republican primary. Semi-closed primaries allow voters to change party registration on Election Day. Primaries in other states are open primaries . One type of open primary allows voters to choose when they enter the polling place which party’s primary they wish to vote in. Another type of open primary, the top two primary, allows all voters, regardless of party, to vote in the same primary election. Every voter gets the same ballot and the two top vote-getters for each office, regardless of their party affiliation, face off against each other in the general election (Louisiana, Washington, and California). However, in Louisiana, if a candidate receives a majority of the primary vote, he or she wins the office outright. Not so in the other two states. At one time, Alaska, California, and Washington had blanket primaries in which voters could vote in both party primaries simultaneously—voting for one party’s candidate for one office, and for another party’s candidate for another office. But the U.S. Supreme Court ruled blanket primaries unconstitutional in 2000,⁵ which thrilled leaders in both parties who did not like them because they allowed “outsiders” to influence the nomination of their party’s candidate.

In 2010 California voters approved the voter-nominated “top two” primary whereby the top two vote-getters in primary races for congressional, state legislative, and statewide offices (but not the presidency) run against each other in the general election. Californians, fed up with the state’s squabbling politicians and a growing budget deficit, approved Proposition 14 by a 54 to 46 percent vote. (For a more detailed look at the arguments for and against this new top two primary system, see “Did You Know? California’s “Top Two” Primary System: Bipartisanship Promise Appeals to Other States.”)

Party leaders generally prefer the closed primary because they fear crossover voting and raiding. Crossovers are voters who choose to vote in the primary of the party that they usually do not support in the general election. Raiding is an organized attempt to cross over and vote in order to defeat an attractive candidate running for the opposition party’s nomination. However, there is no evidence that large numbers of voters connive in such a fashion.

(The following discussion is not relevant to the three states where voters, not the parties, nominate candidates to run in the general election.) In most states, the plurality winner of the party’s primary election—the candidate receiving the most votes, whether a majority or not—becomes the party’s nominee. But in some states, a candidate must win a majority of votes in a primary election to become the party’s nominee. If no candidate succeeds in winning a majority in the first primary, a runoff primary is held between the top two vote-getters.

Runoff primaries are linked to the traditional one-party politics of the southern states. Runoff primaries prevent a candidate with a minority of party voters from capturing the nomination in a race with three or more contenders. Presumably the runoff primary encourages candidates to seek majority support and prevents extremist candidates from winning nominations. No one can win a nomination by relying on splits among multiple opponents.

First primary front-runners have a better-than-even chance of winning the runoff. Overall, front-runners win about two-thirds of runoff primaries for state legislative seats, although they win only slightly more than half of the runoffs for governor and U.S. senator.⁶

Runoff primaries have been attacked as racially discriminatory. In districts where there is a large but less than majority black population and a history of racial bloc voting, black candidates who win a plurality of votes in the first primary may be defeated in the runoff if white voters unite behind the white runner-up. (It is possible, of course, for the reverse to occur in a majority black district.) One study of local runoff primaries in Georgia found

State conventions continue in a handful of states. In New York and Connecticut, statewide party conventions nominate candidates; however, candidates can “challenge” the convention nominee to a primary election if the challenger receives a specified share of the convention vote (25% in New York, 20% in Connecticut).

Statewide party organizations seldom have much influence over primary outcomes. State party chairs and state party committee members generally don’t like to publicly “take sides,” often seeing it as equivalent to having to pick which of your offspring you love the most. Plus by avoiding endorsements during the primary stage of an election, it makes it easier to mount a united front behind the party’s nominee in the general election.

Every four years, state parties play a major role in nominating the party’s candidate for president. In most states, each party holds a presidential primary election, usually, but not always, on the same day. But in some states, like Iowa, parties may use caucuses to select the presidential candidate they would like to see officially nominated at the national party convention. A party caucus is a meeting of voters at some officially designated location for the purpose of choosing who they prefer to be their party’s standard-bearer in the race for president.

Beginning with the 2008 presidential election cycle and continuing to 2012, a number of states began moving up the date of their primaries (front-loading)—even defying national party calendar rules—to have more influence over the selection of the nominee. Florida and Michigan, two large diverse highly urbanized states, defied party-adopted calendars in both years and held their primaries ahead of the schedule agreed upon by both the Republican National Committee and the Democratic National Committee. These maverick states argued that beginning the presidential nomination process in two small, rural states (Iowa, New Hampshire) would yield a party nominee that would have trouble winning the more diverse battleground states with lots of Electoral College votes.

Every four years, the “calendar debate” between national party leaders and state party officials is revived. Each state’s party leaders want their voters to have a major influence on who their party will nominate for president, which is precisely what prompts front-loading. The battle over the 2016 presidential primary calendar began in March 2013, when Nevada and Arizona launched moves designed to challenge Iowa and New Hampshire’s status as the nation’s first caucus and primary of the presidential cycle.

While parties may be pushed toward the ideological center in order to win elections, the activists in the parties tend to be strong ideologues—people who take consistently “liberal” or “conservative” positions on the issues. Republican Party activists tend to be more conservative than the general public, and Democratic Party activists tend to be more liberal than the general public. This is true even though activists in both parties tend to be more conservative in a conservative state and more liberal in a liberal state.¹⁰

In the southern and border states, as the Republican Party has grown in strength, Democratic and Republican Party activists have clearly separated themselves along ideological lines. Today, there are fewer conservatives among Democratic Party activists in the South than in previous eras. As conservatives drift toward the Republican Party, the liberal strength within the Democratic Party increases. Blacks have assumed increasingly active and influential roles in southern Democratic Party organizations, while fundamentalist white Protestants have become an increasingly active force in Republican circles.¹¹ The result is greater ideological cleavage between the parties.

Party activists—people who serve in party posts as committee members or chairpersons at the city, county, or state level, or as delegates to party conventions—constitute a recruitment pool for candidates for public office. Often these people initially volunteered for party work with the expectation of eventually running for public office. Their party activity provides technical knowledge as well as personal contacts that become useful in their own future campaigns. Party workers generally have voter registration lists available to them as well as information regarding ballot access, filing dates, campaign expenditure reporting, and other useful information. And, of course, party workers come into personal contact with key campaign contributors.

American political parties are decentralized in their organization. Power flows from the bottom up, not the top down. (See Figure 5-1.) It is not really surprising in the American system of federalism—when only the president and vice-president have national constituencies, and senators, representatives, governors, state legislators, and county and city officials all have state and local constituencies—that the American parties are decentralized.

At the national level, the Democratic and Republican parties consist of a national committee; a House and Senate party conference; and various national clubs, such as Young Democrats and Young Republicans. There are also 50 state parties, which are composed of state committees and county and city organizations. This structure is tied together loosely. State committees are generally involved in important statewide elections—governors, U.S. senators, and representatives in the smaller states. City and county committees are generally responsible for county and municipal offices, state legislative seats, and congressional seats in the larger states. The Democratic and Republican National Committees exist primarily for the purpose of holding national conventions every four years to select the party’s presidential candidate. Since each level of party organization has “its own fish to fry,” each operates quite independently of the other levels.

Party affairs are governed largely by the laws of the states. Each state sets forth the conditions that an organization must meet to qualify as a political party and to get its candidates’ names printed on the official election ballots. Each state sets the qualifications for membership in a party and the right to vote in the party’s primary election. State laws determine the number, method of selection, and duties of various party officials, committees, and conventions. The states, rather than the parties, decide how the parties shall

nominate candidates for public office. Most states require that party nominations be made by direct primaries, but several states still nominate by party caucuses or conventions. Most states also attempt to regulate party finances, although with little success.

State party organizations officially consist of a “state committee,” a “state chairman,” or “chairwoman,” and perhaps a state executive director and an office staff working at the state capital. Democratic and Republican state committees vary from state to state in composition, organization, and function. Membership on the state committee may range from about a dozen up to several hundred. The members may be chosen through party primaries or by state party conventions. Generally, representation on state committees is allocated to counties, but occasionally other units of government are recognized in state party organization. A state party chairman or chairwoman generally serves at the head of the state committee; these people are generally selected by the state committee, but their selection is often dictated by the party’s candidate for governor.

In recent years state party organizations have strengthened themselves, despite the rise of candidate-centered politics. They have become “service agencies”¹² providing an array of technical services to their candidates—telephone polling facilities, Web site designs, lists of potential contributors, direct mail and telemarketing systems, links to media outlets throughout the state (with reporters’ names and phone numbers listed), access to campaign and media consultants, Spanish-language training, advice on election law compliance and campaign finance reporting, research (including “oppo research” on the weaknesses of opponents), and even seminars on campaign techniques. Virtually all state parties now have permanent headquarters in the state capital. Most state parties today have full-time professional staff in addition to part-time help and volunteers. They are geared up to hold press conferences and issue press releases on a moment’s notice, often in response to some activity or pronouncement by the opposition party.

Yet, state party organizations are only a part of the broader network that includes candidate organizations, interest groups regularly aligned with the party (unions and teacher organizations are especially important to Democrats), professional political campaign consultants, and professional fund-raisers.

It is difficult to assess whether or to what extent the strength of state party organizations contributes to electoral success in a state. So many other factors affect electoral success that it is difficult to estimate the independent effect, if any, of party organizational strength. But it is widely believed among party activists that sophisticated organizations improve prospects of victory for the party’s candidates.

State party chairpersons are by no means political hacks. Most state chairpersons have been successful business people, lawyers, or public officials who may even serve their posts without salaries to satisfy their interest in politics and public affairs. Some come up through the ranks of local party organizations and have never held elective office; others started in elective politics. While in that position, they routinely interact with local party leaders who then become their supporters when they seek the state party chair position. (See People in Politics: State Party Chairs—Two Paths to Leadership.)

State party chairpersons can play different roles from state to state. Some see themselves as mere “political agents” of their governor; others are independently powerful. In general, chairpersons of the party out of power have more independence and power than those of the party in power. The latter are overshadowed by their governor. Party chairpersons do not hold on to their jobs very long—the average is less than three years.¹³

Party organizations at the county level can be found almost everywhere. The organizations include:

• An active chairperson and executive committee, plus a few associated activists, who in effect make most of the decisions in the name of the party, who raise funds, who occasionally seek out candidates to fill out the party’s slate in the general election (or approve the candidates who select themselves), and who speak locally for the party.

• A ward and precinct organization in which only a few local committee members are active and in which there is little door-to-door canvassing or other direct voter contact.

• The active participation in organizational matters of some of the party’s elected public officials, who may share effective control of the organization with the official leadership of the party organization.

• Financial contributors to the party and its candidates, together with leaders of local interest groups that generally ally themselves with the party.

Republican and Democratic county chairpersons probably constitute the most important building blocks of party organization in America. City and county party officers and committees are chosen locally and cannot be removed by any higher party authority. In short, authority is not concentrated in any single statewide organization but is divided among many city and county party organizations.

Few local organizations have a full-time staff, or a permanent headquarters, or even a telephone listing,¹⁴ but they usually have a Web site. (Many local parties get young party activists to design these.) Most rely on volunteers—precinct and county committee members—who seldom meet in nonelection years. Few local organizations have any budget. Most engage in election year efforts at distributing campaign literature, organizing campaign events, putting up posters and lawn signs, conducting registration drives, and even some door-to-door canvassing. The role of local party organizations is mostly supplementary to that of the candidates’ own organizations.

However, when it comes to statewide races (gubernatorial, U.S. Senate, presidential contests), local party organizations are often seen as a vital part of state party-driven GOTV efforts. Thousands of volunteers are needed to chair precinct committees, call potential supporters urging them to vote, and wave signs and give last-minute pitches for their party’s candidates at every polling place.

The Republican Party enjoyed its greatest resurgence in nearly half a century in congressional and state politics in 1994. In that year Republicans captured control of the U.S. House of Representatives for the first time since 1954. At the state level, the GOP gained a majority of governorships for the first time in over three decades (see Figure 5-2). Following the 2004

elections, Republicans occupied governor’s chairs in 28 states, including four of the nation’s five largest states—California, New York, Texas, and Florida. But by 2006, the pendulum had swung back to the Democrats. Expectations were that it would swing back to the Republicans in 2010 and it did. An anti-incumbent, anti-Washington wave that year swept many Republican governors into office, including a number of Republican women governors.

The Democratic Party long enjoyed dominance over state legislatures. In the mid-1970s, the Democratic Party controlled over 30 state legislatures, while the Republican Party controlled only 4. The others were split between the two parties. But the Republican Party’s fortunes in state legislatures improved significantly in the 1990s (see Figure 5-3). Following the 2004 state legislature elections, Republicans controlled 21 legislatures, Democrats 17, with 11 split between the parties. But, as with governors, control shifted back to Democrats in 2006, with expectations that it might swing back toward the GOP in the early 2010s, which it did. Some Democratic Party leaders attribute this shift to Republican-controlled redistricting processes following the 2010 Census and a rise in the number of safe seats making it harder for Democrats to close the gap.

(The redistricting process will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.) Regardless of the reason, Republican state party leaders know the pendulum can easily swing the other way. Politics is volatile, especially in states with large blocs of independents who tend to be swing voters.

Occasionally, elected officials change their political party affiliation. They are usually welcomed with open arms by leaders of their new party at highly publicized press conferences. But when such events happen, the public tends to be skeptical, wondering whether the “switcher” truly had a change of heart or had simply read polls showing growing disfavor with the abandoned party. In 2010, Pennsylvania’s Democratic primary voters defeated Senator Arlen Specter who publicly admitted to abandoning the Republican Party “so I can win.” Alabama’s Representative Parker Griffith, who switched from Democrat to Republican, met the same fate in the GOP primary. Occasionally, high-profile leaders abandon political parties altogether and run as independents, as did Senator Joseph Lieberman from Connecticut who left the Democratic Party and Rhode Island governor Lincoln Chafee who left the Republican Party, Voters seem a bit more amenable to that type of decision.

A unified party government—where the same party controls both houses of the legislature as well as the governorship—is often presumed to be better able to enact its program into law. More important, perhaps, voters are better able to attribute praise or blame for the direction of state government. Under a unified party government, the dominant party cannot escape responsibility for poor performance by blaming it on the opponent party’s control of one house or branch of state government.¹⁷ When that does occur, it is usually because of intraparty squabbles. The greater the control one party has, the more likely it is that factions will emerge within that party’s elected officials, usually along ideological or geographical lines or both.

Legislative gridlock—the failure to enact significant pieces of legislation—is often attributed to divided party government. Studies of state legislatures have shown that the overall output of a legislature (the number of bills passed) is not affected by divided party government. However, it has been shown that divided party government makes the passage of controversial legislation more difficult. When a governor faces a legislature with one or more houses controlled by the opposite party, it becomes more difficult to pass legislation in areas where there are high levels of conflict, often welfare, crime, education, moral issues, and the environment. (See “Divided Government: Governor versus the Legislature” in Chapter 7.) Legislative gridlock under divided government is worse in states with strong interest group systems. Yet in less controversial areas of legislation, such as agriculture, economic development, and transportation, divided party government does not appear to impede the passage of legislation.¹⁸

Party competition is most likely to produce policy differences if there is a bimodal distribution of voters’ preferences in a state; and if the parties have strong organization and ideologically motivated activists, then the parties in that state will offer clear policy alternatives. This notion can be diagrammed as follows: where there is a bimodal distribution of opinion (voters divide into liberals and conservatives), the parties are more likely to take different policy positions. (Think of it as a camel with two humps and know that the farther apart they are, the more difficult it is to come together to work out a compromise

on tough issues.¹⁹) (See Figure 5-6.) In contrast, where there is a unimodal distribution of opinion (voters are less divided ideologically), the parties differ less in their policy positions.

Party conflict over policy questions is most frequent in those states in which the Democratic Party represents central-city, low-income, ethnic, and racial constituencies, and the Republican Party represents middle-class, suburban, small-town, and rural constituencies. In these states, the Democratic and Republican parties will tend to disagree over taxation and appropriations, welfare, education, moral values, and regulation of business and labor—that is, the major social and economic controversies that divide the national parties.²⁰ These schisms make it easier for professional campaign consultants to target a party’s key, core constituents.

Some public relations firms are all-purpose organizations that plan the whole campaign; select a theme; monitor the electorate with continuous polling; produce television and online commercials, newspaper advertisements, and radio spots; select clothing and hairstyles for their candidates; write speeches and schedule appearances (or avoid them if the candidates cannot speak well); and even plan the victory party. Other organizations limit themselves to particular functions, such as polling or television production. Some firms specialize by party, handling only Democratic or Republican candidates; a few firms specialize by ideology, handling liberal or conservative clients. Still other firms are strictly professional, providing services to any candidate who can afford them.

Frequently, polling is at the center of strategic campaign decision-making. At the beginning of the campaign, polls test the “recognition factor” of the candidate and assess which political issues are uppermost in the minds of voters. Special polling techniques can determine what a “winning candidate profile” looks like in a district. The results of these polls will be used to determine a general strategy—developing a favorable “image” for the candidate and focusing on a popular campaign “theme.” Early polls can also detect weaknesses in the candidate, which can then be overcome in advertising (too rich—then show her in blue jeans reading to young children in a poor neighborhood; too intellectual—then show him in a hog-calling contest). Polls can tell whether the party is stronger than the candidate (then identify the candidate as loyal to the party) or whether the candidate is stronger than the party (then stress the candidate’s independent thinking).

During the campaign polls can chart the progress of the candidate and even assess the effectiveness of specific themes and “media events.” A “media event” is an activity generated to attract news coverage, for example, walking the entire length of the state to show “closeness to the people,” or carrying around a broom to symbolize “house cleaning,” or spending occasional days doing manual work in a factory or on a farm. Finally, polls can identify the undecided vote toward the end of the campaign and help direct the time and resources of the candidate.

Polling can be highly political and quite unrepresentative of the voting public. Some campaigns intentionally release polls that do not meet professional standards established by groups like the American Association of Public Opinion Research. Why do they do this? First, because they know that polls will almost always get media attention. Second, they know that few voters really understand how to read or interpret polls and, consequently, will not question the results. To counter the spread of badly biased polling, there are now guides on how to read and interpret polls available to both journalists and citizens. (See Did You Know? How to Read Political Polls Like a Pro.)

The first objective is to increase the candidate’s name recognition among the voters. Years ago, name recognition could be achieved only through years of service in minor public or party offices (or having a well-known family name). Today, expert media advisors (and lots of money) can create instant celebrity. “Exposure” is the name of the game, and exposure requires attracting the attention of the news media. (As one commentator observed: “To a politician there is no such thing as indecent exposure. Obscurity is a dirty word and almost all exposure is decidedly decent.”) A millionaire land developer (former governor and later U.S. senator Bob Graham of Florida) attracted attention by simply working a few days as a ditch digger, busboy, and bulldozer operator to identify with the “common people” and received a great deal of news coverage.

The emphasis of the professional public relations campaign is on simplicity: a few themes, brief speeches, uncluttered ads, quick and catchy spot commercials. Finding the right theme or slogan is essential; this effort is not greatly different from that of launching an advertising campaign for a new detergent. A campaign theme should not be controversial. It might be as simple as “A leader you can trust”; the candidate would then be “packaged” as competent and trustworthy. Equally important is to make sure a candidate “stays on message.” Why? Message discipline makes those phrases more potent, and consistency increases the likelihood that voters will believe what you are saying.²³

Door-to-door campaigning (personal contacting) by candidates or party workers is effective when used, but it is labor and time intensive, and limited in the proportion of voters who can be reached. This is why statewide candidates have to rely more on mass media–based campaign techniques. However, local party organizations may play the role of surrogates for the candidate, walking through neighborhoods handing out brochures, leaving door hangers for those not home, and contacting potential supporters by phone or e-mail.²⁴ But grassroots campaigning by statewide candidates themselves is less common than “shoe leather campaigning” by candidates for the state legislature or other local offices. One positive outcome of door-to-door campaigning? Candidates campaigning that way usually lose weight!

Media campaigning concentrates on obtaining the maximum “free” exposure on the evening news, as well as saturating television, newspapers, and the Web with paid advertising. To win favorable news coverage, candidates and their managers must devise attractive media events with visuals and sound bites too good for the television news to ignore. News coverage of a candidate is more credible than paid commercials. So candidates must do or say something interesting and “newsworthy” as often as possible during the campaign.

Television “spot” advertisements incur costs in both production and broadcast time. Indeed, television may consume up to three-quarters of all campaign costs; about one-third of TV costs go for production of ads and two-thirds to buying time from television stations. The Federal Communications Commission requires broadcasters to make available broadcast time to political candidates for federal office at the same rates charged to product advertisers, but this does not apply to candidates for state and local offices. Ads are big business for professional campaign consultants and for local television stations. The estimated cumulative spending on TV political ads by presidential, state, and local candidates, political parties, and independent political groups in a single election cycle is in the billions. No surprise here. The average cost of a single 30-second spot aired on prime-time network television can cost in the hundreds of thousands of dollars. (To put

things in perspective, the average rate for a 30-second spot during the Super Bowl is over $4 million and rising every year.)

Deciding where to “run” an ad is becoming more difficult as the media habits of Americans change, especially across different generations. No single source of news today is as dominant as network news was in the early 1990s.²⁵ Increasingly, candidates are turning to cable television and radio because they are cheaper and more easily targeted to specific groups of voters (they reach more segmented audiences). Web-based advertising is also on the upswing as more Americans are going online for campaign information. Increasingly Web-based ads are being placed in nonpolitical Web sites; a political ad placed on a fishing-oriented site would certainly catch the eye of the viewer who did not expect to see that type of ad at that location. It is a good example of microtargeting.

Many Americans are choosing the news they wish to watch on the basis of the perceived ideological bent of specific broadcast and cable news outlets and their anchors, news magazine show hosts, and reporters. The same holds true for which radio stations they select, which Internet Web sites they visit, and whose Facebook or Twitter pages they would “like” or “follow.”

Professional media campaigns have increasingly turned to the airing of television commercials and Internet video ads depicting the opponent in negative terms. The original negative TV ad is generally identified as the 1964 “Daisy Girl” commercial, aired by the Lyndon B. Johnson presidential campaign, which portrayed Republican opponent Barry Goldwater as a nuclear warmonger. Over time the techniques of negative ads have been refined; weaknesses in opponents are identified and dramatized in emotionally forceful 30- and 20-second spots. There is little agreement over whether an ad is negative or unfair: What one person labels a “negative” ad, another person may say is “true” depending on their own partisan or ideological bent.

While reformers bemoan “mudslinging,” negative advertising can be effective. Such advertising seeks to “define” or “brand” an opponent in negative terms. Many voters cast their ballots against candidates they have come to dislike. Research into the opponent’s public and personal background, often via “Googling” or “Binging,” provides the data for negative campaigning. Previous speeches or writings can be mined for embarrassing statements, and previous voting records can be scrutinized for unpopular policy positions. Personal scandals can be exposed as evidence of “character.” Victims of negative ads can be expected to counterattack with charges of “mudslinging” and “dirty” politics. If candidates fear that their personal attacks on opponents might backfire, they may “leak” negative information to reporters and hope that the media will do their dirty work for them.

Analyses of the impact of negative ads show it varies by who is delivering the message, who is receiving the message, and by whether the criticism is a personal attack or an attack on a candidate’s issue position. Negative ads focusing on issues have a greater impact than attacks on a candidate’s personal qualities, incumbents are criticized more for running them than challengers, and negative information about a candidate from the press is more harmful to a candidate than negative television ads aimed at that candidate. Studies also find that political novices are more influenced by negative ads than “old hands.”²⁶

The record-breaking number of negative ads aired in the 2012 presidential election²⁷ has raised a new question: Does too much negativity depress voter turnout among some key constituency bases? Nationally, and in some key battleground states (Florida, Ohio), turnout in the 2012 election dropped. Some scholars attribute at least some portion of the blame for turnout decline to a combination of ad over-saturation (with constant airing of conflicting back-to-back ads) and ad negativity. The possible link has sent party officials and campaign consultants scurrying to do further research.

Candidates also seek free airtime on public service programs and televised debates. Underfunded candidates are more dependent upon these opportunities than their more affluent opponents. Thus, well-funded and poorly funded candidates may argue over the number and times of public debates and who is eligible to participate. (Many local television stations limit debate participation to candidates who receive a certain level of support from voters surveyed by a major polling firm.)

A well-designed Web site is now a must for candidates. Webmasters have become vital members of campaign staffs charged with designing and updating the Internet-based portion of a candidate’s campaign. The more interactive the site, the better. Web sites play a big part in soliciting volunteers, raising money, informing voters about upcoming campaign events, and keeping enthusiastic supporters on the bandwagon. Major news media (television, radio, newspapers) routinely promote links to candidate Web sites in their regular news coverage. A particularly clever Web site feature might well be the centerpiece of a prime-time story—free media for the candidate. One thing is certain: the Web site had better be good. The average surfer looks at a site for no more than 20 seconds before deciding whether to “click onward.”

Mobile technologies are vital to improving GOTV efforts. The explosion of smartphones, tablets and other handheld devices has made them an integral part of campaigns and campaign coverage. “Candidates, voters, activists, and reporters are using these vehicles for a wide range of activities—public outreach, fund-raising, field organization, political persuasion, media coverage, and government accountability.”²⁸ Mobile apps, mobile advertising, and text messaging have become essential components of campaigns at the national, state, and local levels. This move to greater reliance on mobile technologies reflects the fact that well over 80 percent of all smartphone and tablet users are registered to vote.²⁹

Can money buy elections? Not always, but money can make a significant difference in the outcome. Let us summarize what research has shown:

• Campaign spending is generally more important in contested primary elections than general elections. In primary elections there are no party labels and the electorate is more easily influenced by the kinds of campaigning that money can buy.

• “Early money”—a sizable campaign treasury available at the beginning of the campaign—is usually more valuable than money coming in later and closer to Election Day, especially in states with Early Voting. A candidate who can raise a lot of money early is perceived as a more credible, viable candidate than one who cannot. In the early stages of a campaign, the press routinely compares the fund-raising totals of the various candidates.

• Campaign spending in primary elections is closely related to electoral outcome where the party organizations are weak; money is less important where parties are strong and they endorse a primary candidate.³¹ Primary voters are more likely than general election voters to be more ardently partisan.

• Campaign spending is more important in larger jurisdictions, where face-to-face campaigning is not possible and mass media appeals are essential. Television ads cost more in big markets and so does direct mail because it must be sent to many more voters.

• After a certain level of campaign spending is reached, additional expenditures do not produce the same effect. A law of diminishing returns seems to operate to reduce the impact of heavy campaign spending.³²

• Incumbent officeholders have a strong advantage over challengers in soliciting and receiving campaign contributions.³³

• However, the advantage of incumbency itself is greater than the advantage of heavy campaign spending. While it is true that incumbents have an easier time obtaining campaign contributions than challengers, only part of the advantage of being an incumbent derives from easier access to money. Most of the incumbent’s advantage is in name recognition and greater news media coverage.³⁴

• Candidates who outspend their opponents win in two out of three elections. Of course, the higher-spending candidates are usually incumbents, and incumbents tend to win even when they are outspent. But in elections in which there is no incumbent seeking reelection, the candidate who spends the most money can be expected to win three out of every four of these open-seat contests.³⁵

• Most contributors want to be personally asked for money by the candidate. A major time commitment by the candidate is needed to raise money (some call it “dialing for dollars”).

The need to raise millions of dollars for political campaigns, especially for costly television advertising, has stimulated the development of many new fund-raising techniques. Campaign financing has moved beyond the small, face-to-face circle of contributing friends, supporters, and partisans. An important source of campaign money now is political action committees, or PACs, which mobilize group financial support for candidates. PACs have been organized by corporations, unions, trade and professional associations, environmental groups, and liberal and conservative ideological groups. The wealthiest PACs are based in Washington, but PAC contributions are becoming increasingly important in state gubernatorial and legislative campaigns as well.³⁶ They are far less likely to be involved in local campaigns, which cost much less to run.

Individual contributions are now sought through a variety of solicitation techniques, including the Internet, direct mail to persons designated by computer programs to be likely contributors, direct telephone solicitation by a candidate or via a recorded message, and live appeals by workers at telephone banks. About 10 percent of the population now claims to have ever contributed to candidates running for public office. But less than one-half of 1 percent contribute in any particular election cycle. Contributors disproportionately represent high-income, well-educated, older political partisans, although Internet appeals have prompted the less well heeled to give. There are, indeed, networks of contributors.³⁷ Some candidates have been able to tap into these networks through specialized mailing lists, telephone directories, and e-mail network listservs.

These specialized techniques supplement the more traditional fund-raising dinners, barbecues, fish fries, and cocktail parties. A successful fund-raising dinner usually includes an appearance by a national political figure, perhaps even the president, or an appearance by a show business celebrity. Tickets are sold in blocks to PACs and to wealthy, individual contributors who will give even more to have a “photo op” with the famous guest. Successful techniques may vary with the political culture of the state—for example, celebrity rock concerts in California versus barbecues in Texas.

States vary in their principal sources of campaign money because they differ in their economic bases and population makeup. In virtually every state, lawyers, lobbyists, and realtors are among the top 10 categories of contributors, although the rank order is different. States differ in the degree to which other types of contributors play a major role in state elections, reflecting differences in their economies: mining in Montana, unions in California and New York, and telecom services and equipment in Vermont.

Individual self-financed candidates and state political parties are also consistently big money sources in state elections. Interestingly, self-financed candidates (those who raise more than half of all campaign contributions from themselves or an immediate family member) make up only around 8 percent of all state-level candidates. They really don’t fare all that well. Over the past nine years, only 11 percent of them have won their races.³⁸

Campaign spending in the state elections varies enormously from state to state. A gubernatorial campaign in a small state may cost only $1–6 million, but campaigns in California, New York, Texas, and Florida can easily top $20 million.³⁹ Special elections can cost even more because the candidates have to reach a lot of voters in a hurry and that spells television advertising.

State legislative campaigns may range in cost from less than $1,000 to nearly $850,000 for seat winners, depending on their competitiveness and the size of the district.⁴⁰ For example, in Maine, on average about $34,270 per candidate was spent on campaigns for a two-year state senate in 2012. However, $454,414 was spent in a race between two candidates competing to represent the Bangor area, for a job that pays $13,852 per year. Why such a difference even within the same state? Because the top-dollar, highly competitive district was seen as a swing seat—one that could determine the balance of power in the state’s Senate. Each party desperately wanted to win it.⁴¹ In general, campaign costs are usually much lower in less populous, more rural states where one political party tends to dominate. For example, candidates for the Idaho Senate on average spent $17,917 while those running for the state house spent $8,940 each.⁴²

Critics of current campaign finance laws argue that the growing amounts of money pouring into campaigns is having a corrupting influence on politics, or at the least, adding to the public’s perception of corruption and their cynicism toward politics in general. That is certainly the opinion of most minor party candidates.

Third parties range from the Libertarian, Progressive, Green, and Reform parties to more single issue–focused ones like the Right-to-Life, Family Values, Real Food, TEA (Taxed Enough Already), Surfers, and Veterans parties.⁴³ (Each state makes its own laws spelling out how a group can formally become a political party.) In one study of third parties across the states, some 100 third parties fielded over 6,000 candidates—fewer than 20 percent of all candidates running for state offices across the United States. Just 2 percent won. Why? Third-party candidates struggle mightily to get high enough name recognition to compete with major party candidates. They need money to do that, and raising money is difficult. Consequently, third-party candidates are more likely to self-finance their campaigns than are Republican or Democratic candidates. According to the same study of third party candidates, third party candidates fared best in Vermont, worst in California. The most successful candidates have run from the Independent and Progressive parties. The least successful have been Libertarians and Green Party candidates. Historically, third-party candidates have done best during tough economic times when voters get really angry with incumbents (regardless of whether they are Democrats or Republicans). But often their greatest success is in forcing the two major parties to incorporate some of their popular ideals.⁴⁴

Most states have enacted laws designed to bring greater “ethics” into political campaigning and reduce the importance of large campaign contributions. Generally these laws attempt to do one or more of the following:

• Limit the size of campaign contributions to a specific race by certain groups (usually political action committees, corporations and unions) and individuals (excluding the candidate); 37 states limit the amount of contributions to candidates by individuals, political parties, and political action committees; 46 states regulate corporate contributions to candidates (25 states set limits on the amount that can be contributed; 21 states prohibit any corporate contribution).⁴⁶

• Limit the overall spending of candidates and parties; usually applies when candidates take public funds for their campaign; several have voluntary limits, such as Hawaii and Colorado, but fewer than half the states impose spending limits.

• Require financial disclosure of a candidate’s personal finances as well as campaign contributions and expenditures—“Who gave it? Who got it?” All states require some disclosure from candidates, committees, and political parties, but some require more detail than others and for reports to be filed in a more timely fashion, often electronically via the Internet.

• Require more detailed financial disclosure of corporate and union spending (in response to the U.S. Supreme Court ruling that lets corporations and unions spend unlimited amounts of money on independent campaign-related advertising).

• Establish public funding of campaign expenses. Fourteen states currently have some type of public financing programs for candidates and/or political parties. Laws differ on how funding is provided (on a matching basis or not) and to which candidates.⁴⁷ But in every case, participation in such programs is optional. Funds are generated in many different ways, depending on the state: tax check-offs, voluntary surcharges, tax credits, or direct state appropriations. Seven states—Arizona, Connecticut, Maine, New Mexico, North Carolina, Vermont, and West Virginia—have adopted “Clean Elections” programs. This variation on public campaign financing allows eligible candidates to finance their campaigns almost entirely with public funds. Once a candidate qualifies by collecting a specified number of small contributions (perhaps as low as $10 or $25), he or she agrees not to collect any more contributions from private sources, but instead to receive a grant from the state to finance his or her campaign. Proponents argue Clean Election reforms free candidates from relying on special interest campaign cash and, once elected, allows them to “consider legislation on the merits without worrying about whether they are pleasing well-heeled donors and lobbyists.”⁴⁸ Opponents of public funding of campaigns cite studies showing it has not been effective.⁴⁹

• Establish regulatory agencies, or “commissions,” to oversee campaign practices.

The initial model for the various campaign finance–related state laws was the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974, which placed limits on the size of individual campaign contributions, required disclosure of campaign finances, provided for public funding of presidential elections through a tax check-off on federal income tax returns, and established a Federal Elections Commission to supervise presidential elections and distribute public funds to candidates.

In 2002, Congress passed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), also known as the McCain-Feingold bill. The specifics of this Act, some of which have already been overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court, apply to federal elections (presidential and congressional):

• Prohibition on soft money contributions to the national parties. However, state and local parties can solicit soft money contributions of up to $10,000 for get-out-the-vote activities in federal elections. “Soft money” refers to contributions made to parties rather than directly to the campaign chests of candidates. Soft money is supposed to be spent for “party-building” activities, get-out-the-vote drives, or general party advertising (e.g., “Vote Republican” or “Vote Democratic”). But state and local parties cannot use soft money for activities directly affecting federal elections.

• Contributions from individuals to federal candidates are limited to $2,500 in 2012 (raised from $2,300 in 2008).

• Campaign ads by corporations, unions, and interest groups, in support of federal candidates, cannot be run 60 days before a general election, 30 days before a primary election (now unconstitutional).

• Expenditures by independent groups made on the candidates’ behalf must be reported to the Federal Elections Commission. Individuals, corporations, and organizations may not pay for any “electioneering communication,” which is defined as any broadcast that refers to a candidate for federal office that is aired within 30 days of a federal primary election or 60 days of a federal general election.

The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that limitations on campaign contributions help further a compelling government interest—“preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption” in election campaigns. But the Court has been reluctant to allow governments to limit campaign expenditures because paying to express political views is necessary in the exercise of free speech. In an important early case, Buckley v. Valeo (1976), the Court held that limiting a candidate’s campaign expenditures that are made from one’s own personal funds violated the First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech.⁵⁰

Later, when called upon to consider the constitutionality of the BCRA, the Court upheld limitations on contributions directly to candidates and to national parties.⁵¹ It also upheld limits on “soft money” contributions to state and local parties, recognizing that these provisions were designed to prevent circumventions of valid prohibitions on campaign contributions. And the Court also upheld a prohibition on spending for “electioneering communications” by individuals and interest groups that are controlled or coordinated with parties or candidates. The Court struck down an attempt by Congress to prohibit children from making campaign contributions.

But still later, the U.S. Supreme Court reconsidered the BCRA’s provisions limiting individual and organization electioneering communications. The Court distinguished between “express advocacy” on behalf of a candidate or party and “issue ads” that are not the functional equivalent of express advocacy.⁵² (In other words, ads that do not urge viewers or listeners to vote for or against a particular candidate or party.) “When it comes to defining what speech qualifies as the functional equivalent of express advocacy, the Court should give the benefit of the doubt to speech, not censorship.” The effect of the decision is to permit political contributors to support organizations unaffiliated with a candidate or party, including nonprofit “527” organizations, that air television ads not expressly endorsing a candidate right up to Election Day.

In 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court went even further in equating money and speech in Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission. The Court ruled that corporations and unions have the same political speech rights as individuals and can therefore use their profits to support or oppose individual candidates for federal offices.⁵³ “Because speech is an essential mechanism of democracy—it is the means to hold officials accountable to the people—political speech must prevail against laws that would suppress it by design or inadvertence.” It also struck down the part of the 2002 McCain-Feingold campaign finance law that banned unions and corporations from paying for political ads 30 days before a presidential primary and 60 days before the general election.⁵⁴ The Court said, “Restrictions on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political communication during a campaign . . . necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached.” However, the ruling did leave some important limits in place. Corporations and unions are still prohibited from giving money directly to federal candidates or national party committees; they may only spend unlimited amounts of their own money advocating independently for or against federal candidates.⁵⁵ And nonprofit groups like Citizens United that advocate for political candidates still must adhere to disclaimer and disclosure laws regarding donors.⁵⁶ Predictably, no sooner had the ruling been released than some in Congress began efforts to draft legislation that would effectively overturn the verdict. But some ardent free speech advocates have continued to press for eliminating campaign spending limits altogether. (See Up Close: A Conflicting View: Eliminate Campaign Spending Limits.)

These decisions not only affect federal campaign finance laws but also the laws of state and local jurisdictions. The Citizens United case affected laws in 24 states. At the time of the ruling, 1 state banned union political activity, 9 banned corporate political activity, and 14 banned both. These states had to adjust their laws to bring them into compliance with the Court’s new interpretation of campaign finance laws.⁵⁷ The Court has also held in another case that a state law that places too low a limit on how much individuals can contribute to a candidate or party violates the First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech. When Vermont placed a $200 limit on campaign contributions for offices in that state, the Court held that limits could not be so low as to prevent challengers from mounting effective campaigns. Vermont’s limits were held to be “disproportionately severe.”⁵⁸

It is not clear whether state campaign finance laws actually succeed in limiting overall spending in elections. Experience suggests that in reality “If you squeeze money out of one arena, it will ooze into another.”⁵⁹ Reforms often squeeze money out of candidates’ hands and into the hands of self-proclaimed voter education groups with narrow agendas and obscure memberships. These groups spend large amounts of money urging voters to support one candidate or another. Opponents of unrestricted independent spending by interest groups argue that the proliferation of SuperPACs is weakening the power of state political party committees by siphoning off funds that are essential to state party building. Many donors that used to give to state parties now prefer giving to independent groups.⁶⁰

Note also that, under Buckley, any candidate can spend unlimited personal wealth on his or her own election campaign, and individuals can spend any amount to advertise their own personal views, as long as they do not spend their money through a party or campaign organization. If anything, the personal wealth of the candidate has become an even more important qualification for successful campaigning. And in states with spending limits tied to public funding of campaigns, more candidates are simply refusing public funds, which means they must raise even more money from donors.

The overall conclusion is one that affirms what many Americans have always believed: “Money always finds a way into the system. . . . Twenty years from now reformers will be screaming for something else. Stay tuned.”⁶¹